Market Makers and the Bid-Ask Spread
Abstract: Market makers are trading firms that continuously buy and sell securities, profiting from the difference between their buying and selling prices while providing liquidity to other market participants. They are compensated through the bid-ask spread and transaction fees, which reflect the costs they incur from inventory risk, adverse selection, and operational expenses. The spread exists as an equilibrium price that balances the liquidity provision service market makers offer against the economic risks they absorb.
Core Concept
A market maker is a registered dealer or trader that stands ready to buy and sell a specific security at publicly quoted prices during market hours. Rather than waiting for a buyer and seller to arrive simultaneously, market makers act as intermediaries, holding inventory in securities and quoting both a bid price (what they will pay to buy) and an ask price (what they will charge to sell). This dual commitment creates a continuous two-sided market, allowing other traders to execute transactions immediately at known prices rather than waiting for a counterparty to emerge.
Market makers are distinct from brokers, who execute customer orders but do not risk their own capital, and from principal traders, who trade only for their own account. Market makers do both: they execute customer orders and maintain proprietary positions. Under U.S. Securities regulations, market makers on stock exchanges are subject to minimum net capital requirements and must comply with order handling rules [1]. On futures exchanges, traders performing market-making functions are required to meet financial standards set by the exchange and clearing firms [2].
How Market Making Works
A market maker typically quotes two prices simultaneously: a bid (lower price at which they buy from others) and an ask (higher price at which they sell to others). The difference between these prices is the bid-ask spread. For example, a market maker might quote 100.00 bid and 100.05 ask for a corporate bond, meaning they will buy bonds from anyone at 100.00 and sell bonds to anyone at 100.05. If a customer buys at 100.05 and another customer later sells at 100.00, the market maker has captured 0.05 as gross profit from the transaction pair, offset by holding costs and operational expenses during the interval.
Market makers manage their inventory actively. If they accumulate more of a security than desired, they may widen their bid price (lower the amount they offer) or move both their bid and ask down to encourage selling and discourage buying. Conversely, if inventory becomes scarce, they tighten spreads or move quotes higher to attract supply. This dynamic adjustment of quotes is a core function: market makers are constantly calibrating prices to match supply and demand pressure while protecting their capital from adverse moves [3].
The relationship between spreads and volume is mechanical. During high-volume periods when many orders arrive in rapid sequence, a market maker can execute transactions quickly without accumulating unwanted inventory, so spreads narrow. During low-volume periods when orders are sparse, market makers face greater inventory uncertainty, so spreads widen to compensate for the increased risk of being stuck holding a position that might move against them before the next customer arrives.
What Market Makers Are Paid For
Market makers earn compensation in three overlapping ways.
The bid-ask spread is the primary source of revenue. When a customer buys at the ask and sells at the bid, the market maker keeps the spread. Over thousands of transactions, this accumulates into profit or loss depending on whether the market maker correctly predicted the direction of price moves and managed inventory efficiently.
Inventory holding carries economic cost. If a market maker buys 1,000 shares at 100.00 and prices move to 99.50 before they can sell, they lose money on that position. The spread must be wide enough to compensate for this risk over the full distribution of price moves. Wider spreads and higher volatility go together: in highly volatile markets, bid-ask spreads are typically wider because the risk of adverse price movement is greater.
Adverse selection is a key but less visible compensation driver. Some customers have better information than the market maker. If a market maker unknowingly buys from an informed trader who is selling because they know prices will fall, the market maker has taken the wrong side of the trade. The spread must be wide enough to protect against this scenario. Empirically, bid-ask spreads are wider in stocks where trading volume is concentrated among informed institutional traders and narrower when trading is diffuse [4].
Operational costs include technology infrastructure, regulatory compliance, risk management systems, and staffing. These are fixed or semi-fixed costs that market makers must recover from the spread. Firms with lower operational costs can sustain narrower spreads and compete more effectively.
Why the Spread Exists
The spread is not arbitrary; it emerges from equilibrium between supply and demand for liquidity. Without a spread, market makers would have no incentive to continuously buy and sell, and liquidity would vanish. With a very wide spread, customers would avoid trading and seek other venues, forcing the spread down. The observed spread in any market is an equilibrium outcome.
Consider the case of a lesser-traded corporate bond. Few customers want to trade it at any given moment. A market maker choosing to quote prices in this bond faces high inventory risk: they might buy bonds in the morning only to discover by afternoon that they still hold them, exposed to any price movement. The required spread must compensate for this wait time and uncertainty. If spreads are 1 to 2 basis points (0.01 to 0.02 per 100 of par value), the market maker can sustain this position and expect to break even or profit modestly after costs [5].
Contrast this with a highly liquid security such as the S&P 500 E-mini futures contract, which trades tens of thousands of contracts per second. Market makers can buy and immediately sell to other customers, turning inventory in milliseconds. The reward for minimal risk is commensurately low: spreads in the most liquid contracts are often fractions of a cent, and profits depend on executing at extreme scale.
This relationship between liquidity and spread width reflects a fundamental trade-off: wider spreads subsidize market making in illiquid securities (and during illiquid periods), while narrow spreads in highly liquid securities are only viable at high volume and with minimal operational costs.
Worked Example: Corporate Bond Market
The corporate bond market illustrates these principles concretely. Bond trading is less centralized than equity trading, and spreads vary dramatically by bond-specific characteristics.
A large, recently issued bond from a highly rated issuer might trade with a spread of 1 to 3 basis points. The bond has recent trading history and many potential buyers and sellers. A market maker in this bond faces manageable inventory risk and can quickly find counterparties, so a narrow spread is sustainable.
An old, seldom-traded bond from the same issuer might trade with a spread of 10 to 50 basis points. Few customers want it. A market maker holding an inventory position in this bond faces hours or days of potential adverse price movement before finding a buyer or seller. This illiquidity risk drives the wider spread. During a period of market stress, when customers become more selective and trading volume drops across the board, even actively-traded bonds see spreads widen 2x to 5x their normal levels because market makers have higher inventory risk and face greater adverse-selection problems [4].
Limitations
This framework assumes continuous and efficient price discovery, which does not always hold. During market dislocations (crashes, liquidity crises, regulatory halts), bid-ask spreads widen dramatically or disappear entirely because market makers withdraw from quoting. The theory predicts this outcome but does not explain how long recovery takes or under what conditions market makers re-enter; these are empirical questions dependent on firm risk management and regulatory intervention.
The analysis treats spreads as compensation for market makers but abstracts away the welfare effects on customer-traders. For customers, wide spreads raise the cost of trading. If spreads in a given security are 50 basis points, a customer who buys and then sells incurs a 50-basis-point round-trip cost regardless of whether prices rise or fall. This mechanical cost can dominate returns for short-term traders or low-frequency traders, while having minimal impact on long-term investors. The model does not capture these distributional effects.
also, the spread is only part of the total cost of trading. Commissions, clearing fees, exchange fees, and market-impact costs (the tendency for large orders to move prices before they are fully filled) can exceed the spread itself, especially for less liquid securities or large trades. The spread is therefore a necessary but incomplete measure of market quality.
Modern markets are fragmented across multiple venues and execution methods (lit exchanges, dark pools, broker-dealer internalisation), and spreads vary across venues for the same security. The simple two-sided spread model does not fully capture this complexity. The theory is also silent on how market maker compensation should optimally be structured; the current system (spread-based) may not minimize total cost to the economy compared to alternative structures (flat fees, venue-subsidised liquidity).
Summary
Market makers provide liquidity by continuously quoting buy and sell prices, absorbing the inventory risk and adverse-selection risk that other traders wish to avoid. They are compensated through the bid-ask spread, which reflects the economic costs of holding inventory and the probability of trading against informed counterparties. The spread is narrower in highly liquid securities where transaction volume is high, and wider in illiquid securities or during periods of elevated market uncertainty. The spread represents an equilibrium: it is wide enough to incentivize market makers to supply liquidity but narrow enough that customers find trading worthwhile. Understanding the spread is therefore central to understanding how financial markets function and what liquidity actually costs.
Key definitions
Bid: The price at which a market maker will buy a security from other traders.
Ask: The price at which a market maker will sell a security to other traders.
Bid-ask spread: The difference between the ask price and the bid price, typically expressed in dollars or basis points, which represents the gross compensation to a market maker for executing one round-trip transaction.
Inventory risk: The risk that a price move will occur while a market maker holds an unsold or unbought position, resulting in a loss on that position.
Adverse selection: The risk that a market maker's counterparty possesses information not known to the market maker, resulting in the market maker taking the unfavorable side of a trade.
Liquidity: The ease and speed with which a security can be bought or sold in large quantity at prices close to recent transaction prices.
Market maker: A registered trader or firm that continuously offers to buy and sell a security at publicly quoted prices for its own account, with the obligation to maintain a two-sided market during market hours.
References
-
SEC Office of Market Intelligence, "Market Structure and Transparency" rule amendments and guidance on market-maker registration and obligations (2015+). Https://www.sec.gov/rules
-
CME Group, "Futures Contract Specifications and Clearing Requirements", rulebook section on participant financial standards and risk management. Https://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook
-
Nasdaq, "Rules for Market Makers," Chapter 4, detailing quoting obligations and spreads. Https://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com
-
Demsetz, H., "The Cost of Transacting," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 82, No. 1 (1968): 33-53. Https://doi.org/10.2307/1882244
-
Stoll, H. R., "The Pricing of Security Dealer Services: An Empirical Study of NASDAQ Stocks," Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1978): 1153-1172. Https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02054.x
Educational research on historical data only. Not investment advice, not a signal, and never a performance promise. Past results do not predict future performance. Every reference is link-verified before publication and every paper is re-audited weekly against the library's editorial standard.
Last reviewed by the PropLedger research pipeline: 2026-11-16. Educational research on historical data, not financial advice.
Keep reading
How to Choose a Trading Style: A Decision Framework for Beginners
Trading style—the frequency, holding period, and structure of trades—shapes exposure to risk, capital requirements, and the blend of technical skill and emotional discipline required. This paper examines the
How to Read an Academic Finance Paper as a Trader
Academic finance papers offer traders access to research on market behavior, risk dynamics, and trading strategy mechanics that would take years to develop independently. However, papers written for
Market Makers: Function, Compensation, and the Mechanics of the Spread
Market makers are financial intermediaries who earn revenue by quoting both a bid price (willing to buy) and an ask price (willing to sell) for a security, contract,